38TH BOMBARDMENT SQUADRON (H)

Office of the Intelligence Officer

APO #244

13 September 1944

NARRATIVE RESCUE REPORT

Mission No. H-328

This report concerns the rescue of Lt. Frederick Dodd and crew, Airplane No. 42-100376, #3 airplane of "a" Flight, 38th Bombardment Squadron (H), which was No. 1 element of a 4-squadron attack on Iwo Jima Island, Kazan Group, 3 September 1944.

The crew was composed as follows:

2nd Lt. Frederick C. Dodd, Pilot

2nd Lt. Howard G. Miller, Co-pilot

2nd Lt. Iver R. Swenson, Navigator

2nd Lt. Benjamin R. Cook, Co-pilot-Observer

2nd Lt. Richard E. McBride, Bombardier

T/Sgt. Julio Depuma, Radio Operator - Right waist gunner

S/Sgt. Donald E. Hunnicutt, Ass’t Engineer - Top turret gunner

S/Sgt. William J. Kopp, Ass’t Radio Operator - Tail turret

S/Sgt. John J. Mullen, Armorer-gunner - Ball turret

S/Sgt. John W. Kinnaman, Armorer-gunner - Nose turret

T/Sgt. Richard L. Williams, ASN 35371038, Engineer, (Deceased)

Approximately five (3) minutes distant from Minami Rook, enroute to the target, #1 engine of Lt. Dodd’s plane, a B-24J, went out. Lt. Dodd turned back at 030328Z, and the prop was feathered as the plane passed under "C" Flight. The prop came to a full feathered position twice, but lasted only momentarily and then began to windmill again. (This behavior is evidence that the prop-feathering solenoid at the engine had stuck and did not release when the prop was feathered.) After the second time, it was impossible to feather the prop again. With oil pressure gone, the propeller started running away, going as high as 3,500 RPM’s. The airplane lost altitude from 21,000 to 12,000 feet in four to five (4-6) minutes.

As soon as it was determined that the plane could not be controlled, the pilot gave orders that all equipment be jettisoned. First, all the loose equipment was jettisoned on an equal basis throughout the plane from each station. Then guns and ammunition was jettisoned; work to release the ball turret was started, which took between one (1) and one and one-half (1 1/2) hours to complete. Delay in getting the ball turret out was due to two causes: inadequate tools, and excessively heavy safety wire holding nuts on bolts around the azimuth ring gear. The necessary 9/16” socket for speed wrench was present, but the short extension necessary to remove the last six bolts was missing. Those had to be removed with an open-end wrench. The safety wire was such large gauge steel wire that it was almost impossible to pull it out with pliers.

NARATIVE ESCUE REPORT, Mission No. H-328 (cont’d). 13 September 1944

When the ball turret was out, with the limited supply of tools available, the armor-plate behind the pilot and co-pilot was removed; then armor plate from the top turret; and last the amplidyne motors on the seat of the top-turret were jettisoned. The process was orderly throughout. Only the radio equipment, floatation equipment, personal equipment for each man, and helmets, were kept aboard. As soon as men were finished with their work of jettisoning equipment they were instructed by the pilot to take positions at windows in an effort to locate the Task Force near which they had passed enroute to the target.

Communications were established between 10 and 15 minutes after the trouble first started. The radio operator called the Group Ground Station and reported the emergency of their situation, in the clear; all replies were returned in code. The Ground Station instructed the airplane to send MO’s on 1400 Kc., and reported that Dumbo would come to their rescue. Lt. Dodd’s objective, however, was to locate the Task Force they had seen while enroute to the target, if possible, and bail out in its vicinity. The Ground Station was of no assistance in locating the Task Force. Nor was it possible for the airplane to send MO’s on 1400 Kc as there was no tuning unit on the airplane covering that frequency. MO’s were sent on 1500 Kc.

Approximately one (1) hour after first contacting the Ground Station, contact was made with airplanes of the squadron returning from the Iwo Jima strike. This contact was on VHF, with the Lt. Hulbert (Co-Pilot for Lt. Mourtsen, A/P #954) relaying messages to Captain Lamm, Squadron Commander. (Capt. Lamm could be heard by, but could not hear, Lt. Dodd.) Captain Lamm requested MO’s on 1740 Kc., highest frequency they could get on their radio compass. However, in view of the request from Dumbo for MO’s, they were sent spasmodically on 1500 Kc. Position reports were sent, as directed, to squadron planes and to the Ground Station.

During the first hour and one-half, altitude was lost continually. Air speed was 85-95 MPH, flaps and full aileron and trim tabs were used. Both pilot and co-pilot had to hold the right rudder down in order to keep the airplane on course. The plane would waver 10 degrees to either side of course and continual corrections were necessary. As equipment was jettisoned, air speed increased slightly and flaps were raised to ¼ flaps. After ball turret and armor-plating was jettisoned, no flaps were used and an air speed of 110 MPH was maintained at altitude of 3,000 to 3,500 feet. Average power was settings were 40 inches and 2400 to 2500 RPM’s, with cylinder head temperature around 300 degrees Centigrade. Engines No. 2 and 3 were throwing oil badly. For the last hour before bailing out, altitude ranged from 3500 to 2500 feet.

Preparation for ditching was made as soon as equipment was jettisoned. All emergency equipment was made easily accessible. One life raft was immediately back of the ball turret, one was farther back where it could be gotten at most easily. Crash straps were fastened in place across the airplane and crew positions were established. The pilot and co-pilot had crash straps on.

NARRATIVE RESCUE REPORT, Mission No. H-328 (cont'd). 13 September 1944

At approximately 0600Z a flying boat was seen, (possibly Dumbo) but Lt. Dodd was unable to contact it on VHF. Shortly after this, two or three F6F's were sighted and contact on VHP "D” channel was attempted, but one of the Task Force ships answered instead. Lt. Dodd was uncertain at first who had been contacted. Then the carrier gave him a position of 90 deg., 30 miles from the snip. Lt. Dodd asked to have the fighters escort him to the carrier, which they did. One course correction of plus 10 deg. was made under direction and Lt. Dodd flew between 10 and 15 minutes before sighting the Task Force. Lt. Dodd's co-pilot called to ask if there was any particular position in which they wanted the crew to bail out. The crew was instructed to fly one (1) mile ahead of the formation and slightly off to one side before bailing out.

Ten to fifteen (10-15) minutes before the crew bailed out, Lt. Hulbert (A/P #954) had picked up Lt. Dodd's MO's and reported to Captain Lamm that the airplane was on a 66 deg. heading from the path of the squadron airplanes. Shortly after making the correction they sighted the Task Force and flew near to be certain rescue was possible, before returning to base.

When it was known the crew would bail out, all personnel checked chutes and equipment needed for the bail out. The bomb-bay doors were tested; the left door opened only part way. The pilot instructed the crew that at time for bail out he would ring the emergency bell and wait ten (10) seconds for the crew to clear the plane before he and the co-pilot bailed out.

The plane was set on AFCE two (2) minutes before bailing out. The plane was set on a heading of 80 deg. The crew bailed out at 0633Z. The plane passed through a cloud after the crew was out and none of the crew saw the plane go down. Later, navy personnel said they had seen a fire on the horizon, estimated at ten to fifteen (10-15) miles distant. Weather at the time of bailing out was 3 to 5/10 cumulus, tops at 7-8,000 feet and bases at 2,000 feet.

Crew members bailed out at the following positional T/Sgt. Depuma and Lt. Cook and S/Sgt. Hunnicutt, at the camera hatch; Lt. McBride at the right waist window; S/Sgt. Mullen and S/Sgt. Kopp from the rear of the bomb-bay (only the right side was open); T/Sgt. Williams and S/Sgt. Kinnaman from the front of the bomb-bay, followed by Lt. Dodd and Lt. Miller from the same position, ten (10) seconds later.

In preparation for bailing out the waist window, Lt. McBride dropped out two first aid boxes to see how they would fall and if they would clear the stabilizer. When the bell rang, Lt. McBride was the first to bail out, but he could not recall how he did it. A crew member said he put one hand on the window sill and hopped out as if jumping over a fence. Lt. McBride waited sufficient time to clear the plane before pulling his rip-cord; but his chute did not open when he pulled the cord (possibly mud in the eyelets), he then tore open the flap and the chute gradually opened.

NARRATIVE RESCUE REPORT, Mission No. H-328 (cont’d). 13 September 1944

All bailed out without difficulty or confusion. Lt. Dodd and Lt. Miller waited ten seconds and then bailed out as planned.

Some of the men were able to loosen part of the straps soon after the chutes opened; but it was generally agreed that it was impossible to get out of the chutes before hitting the water. Crew members said they knew how by instruction, but were unable to do it. Several difficulties were encountered. One leg strap came unfastened without difficulty, but weight on the other strap made it practically impossible to unhook. The chest strap presented the same problem. Weight on the strap made it extremely difficult to get the snap opened far enough to slip off the ring. It was believed by several crew members that this condition could be corrected by using a larger snap or a smaller ring, so that the tongue of the snap would not have to be compressed completely back in order to get the ring out.

Once in the water, shroud lines tangled around their legs and, as the chute began to fill with water, tended to pull them down. All agreed that a knife would have been most useful in getting free of the shroud lines.

Lt. McBride was unable to unhook his chest strap until he was under water; then he slipped out of the chute easily. S/Sgt. Mullen had unhooked one leg strap on the way down, but could not get the other unfastened after hitting the water. He soon became exhausted and inflated his Mae-west. He was not yet free of the chute when picked up by the rescue craft. Sgt. Mullan was the only member suffering from shock when picked up, and received immediate first aid.

It was felt that, under the circumstances, jungle packs should not have been worn. The added weight tended to pull them under. S/Sgt. Hunnicutt said ”1 got on my back and the weight of the pack held me there; I had to splash hard to get upright.” It was further suggested that, under circumstances of certain rescue, all excessive clothing should to eliminated before getting into the chute; even heavy service shoes.

It took ten minutes for some of the men to be picked up, fifteen minutes for others, and it was thirty minutes before Lt. McBride was picked up. T/Sgt. Richard L. Williams was not saved. Lt. McBride was the last man to see him; only his head was visible at any time and it is believed that his vest was not inflated. It is probable that he did not get clear of his chute. Crew members reported that he could not swim.

Rescue was made by two (2) gigs sent out from the Task Force. A DD searched the area for one (1) hour, and two or three (2-3) TBP’S patrolled the area until midnight.

S/Sgt. Mullen was treated with morphine and given a Shot of brandy. No one else needed treatment. All survivors reported that treatment by the Navy was excellent.

NARRATIVE RESCUE REPORT, Mission No. H-328 (cont’d). 13 September 1944

Suggestions made by the crew included: A complete kit of tools, with duplication of a few essential tools, should be in the airplane on every mission. Parachute harnesses should be modified so as to unsnap more easily when carrying full body weight. Actual experience in getting out of the harness in the water should be practiced; verbal instruction does not take the place of experience. Crew members should be taught to swim, without exception. It was believed that a whistle or some type of balloon, attached to the life-vest, would be of great aid in locating survivors being picked up by a small boat.

JEAN M, H, AUDETTE,

1st Lieut., Air Corps, Intelligence Officer.

Richard L Williams